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AN APPROACH TO THE DELINEATION OF BANKING MARKETS
The accurate delineation of banking markets is a necessary
prerequisite to an analysis of the competitive environment in banking,
the operational and allocational efficiency of our banking system,
and policy prescriptions for structural change in the banking industry.
While delineation constitutes a crucial foundation for analyses of
competition, it appears that in practice current delineation
techniques at best may be inconsistent, and at worst completely
devoid of ecohomic fationale*
The purpose of this paper is to present a delineation procedure
that can be used to systematically and consistently Identify banking
markets. Section I discusses the concept of a banking market and
reviews prior work in the delineation area. Section II presents the
theoretical development of the delineation procedure, while Section
III offers a statistical adaptation of the procedure to the banking
industry; Section IV gives an empirical example of the technique.
Finally, Section V presents a summary and some conclusions of the
study.
Delineation Techniques
A number of approaches have been used to delineate various
types of economic areas. However, none are very appropriate for
market delineation in the banking industry.
Trade Area Techniques One set of delineation methods Is
designed to outline trade areas. These methods can be classified
In two categories--empirical and theoretical.
Empirical techniques include "customer spotting" and "license
plate analysis." Customer spotting involves a series of customer
interviews at the place of business. These Interviews obtain
information on the address of the customer to relate business loca
tion to customer location. In license plate analysis, license plate
numbers of customer cars in the relevant businesses' parking lot are
recorded to determine the extent of the trade area (Markln, 1971,
pp. 195-196).
The foremost theoretical technique for trade area delineation
is the gravitational approach as developed by Reilly (1931) and
modified by Converse and Huegy (1952, pp. 388-394). In the gravita
tional approach the trade area maintained by a firm Is a function of
the distance from its customers and the size of the town in which It
is located. The approach has been modified in some instances to use
driving time in place of distance and firm size Instead of town
population. Another theoretical approach, developed under the
so-called "economic law of market areas", identifies the boundary
line between two geographically competing areas for like goods as a
hyperclrcle. The delineation is based on freight and price differ
ences (Hyson and Hyson, 1950, pp« 319-327).
Because these techniques are designed to identify trade areas,
they offer little direct help in the task of market delineation.
However they can be of indirect benefit (as will be shown .later)
r
in the delineation process and in the overall evaluation of the
allocation of banking services.
Political and Ad Hoc Boundaries Because of the difficulty
encountered in developing a systematic and consistent approach to
market delineation^ many studies have used city, county, or SMSA
boundaries to define market areas (e.g. Kaufman, 1966). Justifi
cation for the use of these political or population areas is
usually based on data availability. But political or population
boundaries may be quite unrealistic as criteria to delineate
market areas. Cities and SMSA's include only urban areas. While
counties do include both urban and rural areas, they usually are
a result of political decisions made years ago. Furthermore,
the concept of a market is virtually ignored. Thus, political
and ad hoc boundaries are not appropriate to define banking markets,
Cross-Elas'ticitv Methods The most theoretically appealing
delineation technique is based upon cross elasticities. As indi
cated in the definition of a banking market, one should be able to
distinguish banking markets on the basis of differences in the size
of cross elasticities between banks.
Specifically cross elasticity is defined as
dq. P.
(1) E, - ^
where
^ii ^ cross price elasticity between bank i
and bank j;
« the change in bank j's level of service;
apj^ « the change in bank i's price;
p^ •» the original price maintained by bank i;
q. the original level of service maintained by
bank j.
Theoretically, when approaches zero, there exists an isolated seller,
If is greater than zero, then a non-isolated seller exists.
The distinction between isolated and non-isolated sellers is con
tingent upon the existence of interdependent price and output policies
between the banks. In the case of an isolated seller, approaches
zero, and no interdependence exists. But this could indicate the
presence of either pure competition or isolated monopoly. The bank
ignores its rivals, either because there are none as in the case of
monopoly, or because the market is so atomistic that one firm has no
bearing on the price and output of others in the industry as is the
case with pure competition.
Because of the restrictions on entry in the banking industry. It
is reasonable to assume that few cases of pure competition exist.
Thus, a case of approaching zero likely reflects the existence of
an isolated monopoly or two banks in separate markets. Accordingly,
where is greater than zero, a situation of non-isolation or
oliogpoly likely exists. The banks are in the same market.
Although cross elasticities are theoretically appealing for
market delineation purposes, they are difficult to measure empiri
cally. Ceteris paribus demand functions for both banks must be
estimated. In addition, elasticities are a static concept—they
are not dimensioned over time. Measurement of the interdependence
of two banks involves both the magnitude of a reaction and the
timing of it.
Thus, a desirable technique for market delineation would be one
that incorporates the theoretical appeal of the cvoss*elasticity
approach, avoids the arbitrariness of the ad hoc approaches, offers
the empirical applicability of the trade area techniques, and
recogonizes the dynamics of competitor reactions. The next section
presents an approach that attempts to satisfy these criteria.
II, Theoretical Basis for a Delineation Procedure
The conceptual underpinnings for the following delineation procedure
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are based, as is the cross elasticity approach, on the Interdependence
among bank pricing functions. Assume that two banks are profit maxi-
mizers operating either in an oligopoly setting in the same market, or
in separate markets. If the two banks are in the same market, the
demand for the services of one bank is dependent upon the price of
those same services offered by the second bank. Specifically,
(2) = ^i^Pi' PiV
where the variables are defined as in equation If the cost
function of bank i is defined as a function of the level of its
service
(3) c. = C^(q^),
the profit expression for bank 1, 11^, can be written as
W
or
(5) = p^QiCPi, Pj) - c^lQiCPi, Pj)]
If price is regarded as the bank's decision variable, first order
conditions for profit maximization require that
(6) = Pi!^ + Qicpi. -p,) - = 0^
3Pi 3Pi ^ ^ J dQ^ 3^7
This equation represents the amount of change in bank i's profits
resulting from a change in the price of its services.
The crucial measure of interdependence, however, is the existence
of a price response by bank 1 to price changes by bank j. To isolate
and determine this potential price response, both p^ and p. must be
allowed to vary. This can be represented by taking the total differ
ential of equation (6) with respect to p^ and p^ and then solving
for dp^/dpj.
(7) =
dpj
a^Qi + ^<^1 .
-
ap^sp. dQi Sp. 3p. dQi
dC.
1 -
3Pi 3Pi dQi . 2aPi dQ.2
Sp^ ap
1 L ;]
'i-
If the existence of rivalry between the two banks la defined In
terms of cross elasticities, two cases can be isolated: (1) the rival
case in which > 0, and (2) the nonrlval case in which E^. = 0.
Note that the nonrlval case Implies that dQ,/Sp. ® 0, since it can
be assumed that both p^ and q^ will be nonzero. Application of these
cross elasticity conditions to (7) results In
(8)
dp, .
> 0
dPi
for the rival case, and
(9) 0
3/for the nonrival case,—' If two banks are rivals in the same market,
the price response will be nonzero. If two banks are nonrivals or in
separate markets, the price response will be equal to zero.
In a comparative static framework, the result in (8) implies
that the time period of adjustment of bank i's price to changes in
bank j*8 price will be instantaneous~-response time will be zero.
In contrast, (9) Implies that since bank i and bank j are nonrivals,
bank i will never respond to price action by bank j--re3ponse time
will be infinite. These two extreme response times form the basis
for a statistical procedure for market delineation.
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III. Statistical Adaptation of the Model
Observed V3> Theoretical Response Times
While the above theory implies that the response time of one bank
to another will be either zero or infinite, in reality it can be
expected that response times will be nonzero but finite. For two
rivals, price reactions may not be instantaneous because of information
or decision lags. If bank i changes its price, it may be some time
before bank j is aware of that change. Or, even if bank j inmediately
discovers the change in bank i's pricing policy, the decision process
may result in a delay before bank j can implement its own price
changes. Thus, it is likely that for rivals, the response time will
be nonzero.
Likewise, even for two nonrivals it is unlikely that observed
response time will be infinite. Bank j bases its pricing decisions
on variables other than the price charged or offered by bank i,
Eventhough bank j does not respond to bank i's price, it may alter
its price at some future date in response to other changing conditions.
Thus, violation of ceteris paribus conditions will cause observed
responses of nonrivals to be finite.
Because both rivals and nonrivals may exhibit nonzero but
finite resptonse times, it is necessary to develop an empirical proce
dure which can identify significant differences in finite response
times. Standard statistical methods offer such a procedure.
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Rationale ftrtr the Statistical Technique
The basic assumptions of the empirical market delineation proce
dure are that (1) banks can be classified into two groups--rivals and
nonrivals, and (2) the average response time between nonrivals is
significantly greater than the average response time between rivals.
For example, as shown in Figure 1, let R represent a sample of response
times drawn from a response time population of rival banks. Then
sample mean, is an estimate of the average response time
for rival banks. Now let U represent a sample of response times
drawn from two unclassified banks, and the average response time
of those banks. If Xy is significantly greater than the two
banks can be classified as nonrivals and included in separate
markets. If X^ is not significantly greater than X^^, the two banks
can be classified as rivals and included in the san^p market.
Application to the Banking Industry
To apply the empirical procedure to the delineation of banking
markets, it is necessary to (1) identify a priori a sample of rival
banks, (2) determine the appropriate price variable for measurement
of response times, and (3) select an appropriate statistical tech
nique to test the significance of differences in response times.
The a priori sample of rival banks is defined to include banks
located in the same town or city. It is presumed that if two banks
are located in the same town or city, they must have interdependent
pricing functions. Because of their close proximity, actions of one
bank will affect the decisions of other banks in the city,^ Further
more it is presumed that response times between banks in the
Frequency
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Figure 1: Sample Distributions o£ Rival Bank
and Unclassified Bank Response Times
Response time
(days)
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same city can be pooled over different cities to generate the overall rival
sample. This assumption implies that rivals will act similarly regardless
of their geographical location.
The best price variable for measurement of response times would
involve a well-defined service that is homogeneous across banks*
Time deposit rates come the closest to satisfying that criterion.
Homogeneity across banks is guaranteed by federal regulations per
taining to characteristics of time deposit accounts. It Is possible,
of course, that markets defined using time deposit rates may be
different than those which would be defined using loan rates or other
criteria. It Is assumed, however, that for most banks deposit and
loan markets will be similar for the majority of potential customers.
Any statistical technl(|ue which evaluates the significance of
differences in measures of central tendency is a candidate for use
in the delineation procedure. However, because there Is no Information
on the form of the underlying distributions of response time, it is
most appropriate to use a nonparametric technique.
The nonparametric method used In this study tests for level
(or location) differences between two populations and is referred to
as the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) test (Fryer, 1966, pp. 190-193).
The WMW test normally is a one-tailed test with the hypothesis
"o* versus H^: [F(X^) > G(X2)] for all points
along the X scale of measurement, where F and G are the cumulative
distribution functions for X^^ and X^ respectively. The test is based
upon the general assumption that, if the magnitude of the size of X^ '^s
14
is greater than the magnitude of the size of X2's, and if one draws
random samples and of sizes n^ and from the and popu
lations respectively, the x^'s in the combined array of x^'s and x^'s
should tend to outrank the X2's.
In particular, one forms, an ordered array for the combined samples
of x^'s and X2's and computes the variate:
n (n .+ 1)
(10) U = n^n^ + 2 " ^
where T is the sum of the ranks of the x^'s in the combined array.
It can be shown.that the variable U has an approximately normal
frequency distribution with a true mean of
(11) P^u
and a true variance of
« n n,(n + n« + 1)
4 = 12
Thus, the sampling variate
U - (n n^/2)
(13) X =
J (n^n2) (n^ + n^ + 1)/12'
has a N(0, 1) frequency distribution and H can be tested with the use
o
of the cumulative standard normal distribution tables.
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IV, An Empirical Test:
To empirically evaluate the application of the conceptual model
to the delineation of bank markets, data on changes in time deposit
rates since 1960 are being collected from banks in a functional economic
area in Iowa (Fox and Kumar, 1966), The results from seven banks in
this area are used in the following illustration. Two of the seven
banks are located in a town of 3200 people, and the other five are
located in four towns ranging in size from 370 to 2300 people. All of
the banks are located within a radius of 15 miles. Data are being
collected from the remaining 69 banks in the functional economic area
to provide a more complete test of the delineation procedure.
A single page mail survey with personal follow-up is being used
to collect date of change data from each bank. The survey instrument
is shown in the appendix. Although scxne banks expressed difficulty
in completing the survey, others indicated that the data were readily
available from minutes of board of directors' meetings or posting
ledgers for active time-deposit accounts. Note that date of change
information was requested for passbook, 3, 6, or 9 month certificates
of deposit, 1 year certificates, 1-2 1/2 year certificates and
2 1/2-4 year certificates.
Calculation of Response Tfanes
Once the data for the seven banks had been collected, response
times for the rival natnole were calculated. For this Illustration,
the rival sample was defined as the response times between banks A
and B (Table 1), In determining the rival response times, the
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number of days that elapsed from the date of a rate change for the
lead bank and a rate change in the same deposit category by the
rival was calculated. If this elapsed time exceeded 365 days,
the response time was specified as 365 days and any rate change by
any bank following this 363 day period was designated as a new lead«
Only rate changes within the same deposit category were considered
as legitimate responses. Furthermore, any rate change within the
same category, even if rates were not equalized, was considered as
a response.
Next, response times for unclassified banks—banks in the four
surrounding towns--were determined. The response time for an unclas
sified bank was calculated as the elapsed time in days from the date
of change for the lead bank in the rival sample and the date of
response by the unclassified bank. Other rules for a legitimate
response were the same as for the rival staple.
The response times for the rival and unclassified banks
are sunsnarized in Table 1. All seven banks used in this analysis
offered the passbook and 1 year deposit instruments. All banks
except bank C also offered 3, 6, or 9 month certificates of deposit,
so response times in this deposit category were also calculated
where appropriate.
The Statistical Test
As indicated earlier, the WMW test is a nonparametic test that
utilizes the summation of numerical values of the rankings in an array
in the test statistic. The following example will illustrate the
L8
application of the WMW test to the hypothesis that the response times
for bank C to banks A or B are in fact not statistically different
from those in the rival sample.
To implement the WMW test,, the response times for the two samples,
and (Table 1, columns.2 and 1 respectively), are combined into
a single array as follows:
365, 365, 365, 365, 365, 365, 332, 213, 213, 192, 137,
(3.5) (3.5) (3.5) (3.5) (3.5) (3.5) (7) (8.5) (8.5) (10) Ol)
122, 63, 51, 31, 31, 31,. 12, 7, 1, 1, 1,
(12) (13) (14) (16) (16) (16) a8)_ (19^ (21) (21) (21)
where the top values are the response times and the values in paren
theses the respective ranks in the array.^ The sum of the ranks for
fi /x^ is calculated as
^ r(14) T = SRi = 115
r =1
where is the rank of the rth observation in the array. The U
variate is calculated as indicated by equation (10) as:
(15) U = (10) (12) + ^-0(10 ^ 1) _ 115 = 6Q
Finally, the test statistic, x, is calculated as:
(16) . = ^ 60 ^ (10)(12)/2 = = 0 0K (10) (12) (10 + 12 + 1)/12 230
Using the standard cumulative normal distribution tables and a
10 percent significance level, the critical value for \ is 1.28, Since
19
Che calculated test statistic is less than the critical value, the
null hypthesis that the response times come from the same distribution
cannot be rejected.
Table 2 summarizes the various calculated values used to test the
competitor status of the other banks in the sample. Note that the tests
are classified into two categories—a primary test and a secondary test.
The primary test essentially determines if there is any significant
difference in the response times of the unclassified bank to the lead
bank in the rival sample and the response times of the rival
sample. The secondary test determines if there la a significant
difference in the response times between two unclassified banks and
the response times of the rival sample. Consistent with the
concepts of market dynamics, the crucial or primary test is the response
to the lead bank in the market. The secondary test is a weaker test
because It allows substantial delays in responses and the development
of chains. The secondary test can be used to provide additional
evidence that two unclassified banks are in the same market, but it
cannot be used to disprove the results of the primary test* The
calculated \ values for both Che primary and secondary tests are
summarized in Figure 2.
The statistical results of the primary test indicate that the
response times of banks C and D are not significantly different than
those of the rival sample (A and B). Thus, banks A, B. C, and D
would appear to be in the same market. In contrast, the response times
of banks E, F, and Gappear to be significantly different than those
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of the rival sample. —^ Thus, these banks are not In the same
market as A, B, C, and !>• The secondary tests support the hypothesis
that bank C and bank D are in the same market, and thatF, and G-
are in the same market. However, they do not lend support to the
hypothesis that banks E,. F, and G are in a different market than
banks C and D.
To obtain an estimate of the geographic boundaries of the market
area, the results of the^market area delineation were integrated with
delineations of the trade area for each of the five banks. A gravity
model using bank deposits was utilized in the trade irea d^liiiea^on^
The geographic boundaries of the market were obtained by summing the
trade areas for the banks, determined to be in the market, the results
of this geographic delineation of the market area are shown in Figure 3
23
Figure 3: Market and Trade Area Boundaries
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V. Sumaary and Conclusions
The accurate delineation of banking markets is an important aspect
of issues in banking structure. While several methods have been used
to determine geographical boundaries in banking, most are either ecotW)-
mically unsound or difficult to implement. This paper presents an
approach to the delineation of banking markets that is based on standard
oligopoly theory is statistically adaptable to empirical use, and
requires modest amounts of data.
The underlying theory establishes a two class scheme for banks--
rivals and nonrivals. Rivals are banks that respond to each other's
pricing adjustments and are thus in the same marl^t. Nonrivals are
banks that do not respond to each other's pricing adjustments and
are thus in separate markets.
The statistical adaptation of the theory is based on the assumption
that the response time of a bank to a nonrival's price change will be
significantly greater than the response time of a bank to a rival's
price change. Date-of'change data on time deposit rates were collected
from seven adjacent Iowa banks to test the usefulness of the model.
Response times were calculated between all banks and sets of banks.
A sample distribution of rival response times was established and a
nonparametric statistical test was used to test all other response
times against that rival sample. Preliminary results indicate that,
indeed, the approach can be a useful aid in the delineation of
banking markets.
25
The delineation procedure, however, is not without shortcomings.
To accurately use the procedure, the dates o£ rate changes for all
banks must be obtained. If data is missing or incomplete for one
bank, it is impossible to determine in which market that bank belongs.
Furthermore, a market center must be specified to use as the
base for the test. If this base is not used, elongated chains of
rival banks may be identified. A logical criteria would
require the base to be a major trading center with a larger popu
lation than surrounding towns and possibly more than one bank. It
is possible, however, that the choice of the market center could
influence the market delineation. That is, if town X is chosen as the
market center, Y may be included in the same market with X, and Z
excluded. Alternatively, if Z is chosen as the market center, Y
might be included in the same market with Z, and X excluded. Thus,
"gray areas" between well defined market areas may arise.
The quantification of long delays or essentially nonresponses
also presents difficulties. In the preliminary test of the approach,
if a response did not occur within 365 days, the response time was
specified as 365 days. A different rule for quantifing long delays
may result in different numerical results. Also, only responses
within the same deposit category were considered as legitimate
responses. If any change within the entire maturity structure were
considered as a legitimate response, different results again might
be obtained.
Finally, the choice of the time deposit variable as the response
measure may result in problems. Although time deposit categories are
26
homogeneous by law across banks, rates on time deposits are also
highly regulated. In recent years, most banks have paid celling
rates, and many banks have adjusted their rates when changes have
been made in the ceiling regulations. These exogenous, artifical
ceiling regulations may not only impede competition, but also may
confound the measurement of competitive responses and delineation
of bank markets.
27
APPENDIX
Tine Deposit Race Questicnaire
Would you please record your passbook interest rate as well as the Interest rate
on any of the listed certificates of deposit as of January 1, 1960.
RATES PAID
Date Passbook 3, 6 or 9 months 1 year 1-2^$ years years
1/1/60
Please list below by year, months and day, the effective dates of change in any
of these interest rates since January 1, 1960. Also, please list the corresponding
new interest rates in the respective blanks. This information should be readily
available from such sources as minutes of board of director's meetings or posting
ledgers for active time-deposit accounts.
NEW RATES
Date of
Change Passbook 3. 6. or 9 months 1 year 1-2% years 2VA years
Have you made a change from quarterly to daily compounding on passbook savings accounts?
If so, please list the effective date of that change.
Return to; Department of Economics Name^
Iowa State University
Ames, Iowa 50010 Bank
28
FOOTNOTES
1. This is a model, similar to that outlined by Henderson and Quandt
(1971, pp. 231-232). The model considers a bank as a producer of a
set of differentiated services in an oligopolistic market. The bank
thus faces its own distinct demand curve. This framework is considered
appropriate for banking markets because of individual banks* ability
to differentiate their services via customer relationships, tied
sales, etc.
2. It is assumed that second-order conditions for a profit maximum
are satisfied.
3. For the rival case, dp^/dp^ could be either positive or negative
depending upon the sign of the numerator in equation (7). The crucial
distinction, however, is that in the rival case, bank i will respond,
in some manner, to price changes by bank j, in the nonrival case,
bank i will not respond.
4. This identification of the a priori sample of rival banks is
considered appropriate for rural banking markets. For large metro
politan areas, the rival sample may have to be defined otherwise.
5. If identical values occur in the combined response time array,
the rank for each value is determined as the midpoint of the rankings
for the subset of identical values.
6. The ranks for the observations are underlined in the array.
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7. In calculating response times of (E or F) to (A or B), total days
were measured from the lead date by one bank in a two-bank set to the
first response by a bank in the other two-bank set.
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